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ABSTRACT 
THE CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE IN CHINA'S URBAN AREAS 
FENG XU 
2000 
The convening of the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh 
Congress in late 1978 signaled the beginning of China's reform process. Since then, 
China has realized significant development in its economic and sociopolitical areas. The 
Chinese government implemented a gradual reform strategy to revitalize the Chinese 
economy. Step by step, the government granted greater autonomy to the enterprises and 
rural households to raise productivity. At the same time, China gradually steered its 
former centralized planning system toward a market-oriented direction. By introducing 
the market mechanism into its economy, China modified its development path and moved 
toward establishing a socialist market economy by the end of the first decade of the 21 st 
century. In the social and political areas, the Chinese government implemented reform 
policies to foster the economic reform process. Gradually, China opened up its economy 
to the outside world. 
The reform policies enabled the Chinese economy to undergo dramatic structural 
changes. The non public-owned sectors, such as private and foreign-invested economies, 
received accelerated development, which, in turn, resulted in changes in the employment 
structure in China's urban areas. As the Chinese government gradually freed the former 
rigid labor allocation and migration control systems, the unified employment structures 
were diversified, especially the ownership structure of employment in China's urban 
areas. 
iv 
Analyzing empirical employment data shows that following the reform process, and 
more significantly, following the rapid development of non public-owned economies, 
more and more workers found their jobs outside of public-owned sectors. The data 
analysis shows that this tendency has continued until now. The ownership composition of 
employment in China's urban areas has been changed from the former one, which was 
dominated by public ownership toward a diversified composition in which the non 
public-owned sectors became more and more important. In addition, following the 
economic transformation, the unemployment and underemployment problems in China's 
urban areas became serious. 
v 
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Chapter I: Introduction, Objective & Outline 
1.1 Introduction 
In late 1978, China began to implement political and economic reform policies. The 
reform process aimed to transform the Chinese economy from a centralized planning 
system into a decentralized market system. The Chinese leadership intended to steer 
China onto a new path of long-term stable development. 
Since 1978, China has realized startling economic and social development. The 
annual growth rate of the real GNP during the period from 1978 to 1997 averaged close 
to 10%. The population living below the poverty level has fallen from 250 million to 
below 50 million, and the average life span has increased by more than ten years. 1 
Among the thirty-one provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (not including 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao), twenty have an annual per capita GDP growth rate 
surpassing all other countries in the world. In particular, in China's five coastal provinces 
(Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujiang, Guangdong and Shandong), an area and population four to 
five times greater than those of the four Asian Tigers, the annual growth rate in per capita 
GDP averaged 12% during the period from 1978 to 1997.2 
The Chinese government has energetically implemented reform policies and 
introduced market mechanisms since 1978. The economic structure of China has been in 
1. State Statistical Bureau. 1998. China Statistical Yearbook 1998.China Statistical Publishing House. 
2. Lin Y., F. Cai & Z. Li. 1994. The China Miracle. Shanghai People's Press & Shanghai Sanlian 
Bookstore. 
2 
transition as a result of the reforms. The industrial development strategy has shifted 
from a heavy-industry orientation strategy toward a balanced growth development 
strategy. This policy shift has altered the relative contribution to the GNP of China's three 
industrial sectors--agriculture, industry and service, respectively from (1) 28.1 : 48.2 : 
23.7 in 1978 to (2)18.7: 49.2: 32.1 in 1997.3 The pre-1978 public ownership dominated 
economy has been transformed into one with diversified ownership. The reform process 
has increased the pace of development and the role of non public-owned sectors in 
China's economy. In 1978, the ratio of the gross output value of public-owned sectors 
compared to that of non public-owned sectors was 100:0; in 1997, the ratio was 
63.64:36.36.4 
During this reform period, the structure of employment in China has been greatly 
affected. It has been changed from a unified structure to a diversified one, both in rural 
and urban areas. In China's urban areas, in 1978, more than 99% of the work force was 
employed in the public-owned sectors. In 1997, this percentage declined to 
approximately 68.9%.5 
In short, China has been undergoing a substantial economic transformation since 
1978. The country's goal is to establish a socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics. The Chinese leadership plans to fulfill this task by the end of the first 
decade of the 21st century. 
3. State Statistical Bureau. 1998. China Statistical Yearbook 1998. China Statistical Publishing House. 
4. State Statistical Bureau. 1998. China Statistical Yearbook 1998. China Statistical Publishing House. 
5. State Statistical Bureau. 1998. China Statistical Yearbook 1998. China Statistical Publishing House. 
1.2 Objective 
Recent reforms have resulted in substantial structural changes in the Chinese 
economy. An important consequence is the change in the structure of employment in 
China's urban areas. As China extends the reform process, this consequence will become 
an increasingly important issue, especially in the ownership composition of employment. 
The effect of sociopolitical and economic reforms on China's urban labor force is the 
focus of this research project. Due to the limited reform of the Chinese labor market 
before 1978, this research will concentrate on the period from 1978 to 1997. 
1.3 Outline 
The next chapter provides a review of literature. The literature review offers a 
discussion concerning the reform process of China's sociopolitical, economic and 
employment policies. The empirical data analysis chapter documents structural changes 
in the ownership composition of the employment in urban areas. A discussion of the 
current unemployment and underemployment problems in China's urban areas will also 
be provided. The final chapter will summarize this research and identify several 
recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter II. Literature Review 
The literature review consists of two parts: (1 ) A discussion of China's reform 
process since 1978; and (2 ) A discussion of China's recent reform of employment and 
migration policies. 
2.1 China's Reform Process: An Overview 
4 
There is a rich literature concerning China's reform policies since late 1978.6 To 
begin the discussion of China's sociopolitical and economic reform policies since 1978, it 
is useful to review the traditional centralized planning system of China's political 
economic system before 1978, from which a discussion of the former command economy 
(Perkins 1994 ) can be linked to recent reform policies. 
2.1.1 Pre 1978 Era: Heavy Industry Orientation Strategy & Centralized Planning 
Economy 
When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the new Chinese 
government (Chinese Communist Party) inherited a poor country that had suffered one 
hundred years of wars, with 89.4 % of its population living in rural sectors (China 
Economic Yearbook 1981 ). Due to the lack of industrial infrastructure, the Chinese 
6. Kluver[1996]; Perkins[l994]; Wu[l998]; S. Li[1999]; Yabuki[l995]; T. Li[l999] and Lin[l994], etc. 
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government selected a heavy industry orientation strategy to speed economic 
development. According to the research of Y. Lin, F. Cai & Z. Li [ 1994], China chose a 
heavy industry orientation strategy for three reasons. First, in the 1940s and 1950s, 
economic development theories focused on industrialization. Second, the West isolated 
China for political and military reasons. Therefore, it was vital for China to establish its 
defensive forces, which depended mainly on a complete and independent industrial 
system within which heavy industry composed a core part. Finally, from the 1930s to the 
1950s, the former Soviet Union realized significant economic development by using a 
heavy industry orientation strategy. After the national economy was restored in 1953 
from the former troubled state plagued by a long series of wars, China formulated and 
began to carry out the heavy industry orientation strategy ( often referred to as the 
"Forging-Ahead" strategy) through a series of five-year plans. Table 2.1 provides a rough 
description of the strategy's progress from 1953 to the late 1970s. 
Table 2.1: Sector Share of Chinese Capital Investment (%) 
Period Agriculture Light Industry Heavy Industry Other 
First Five-year Plan 7.1 6.4 36.2 50.3 
Second Five-year Plan 11.3 6.4 54 28.3 
1963-1965 17.6 3.9 45.9 32.6 
Third Five-year Plan 10.7 4.4 51.1 33.8 
Fourth Five-year Plan 9.8 2.8 49.6 34.8 
1976-1980 10.5 6.7 45.9 36.9 
Source: State Statistical Bureau. 1993.China Statistical Yearbook 1993. China Statistical 
Publishing House. 
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In order to ensure the success of the "Forging-Ahead" strategy, China established a 
highly centralized planning system. In the early 1950s, China was a poor, capital-scare 
agricultural economy. It was impossible for capital-intensive industries to develop 
autonomously on such a low-level fragmented rural economy. Thus, the government had 
to intervene to fulfill the development goals. In order to lower the costs associated with 
developing the heavy industry sector, the Chinese government artificially suppressed the 
prices of credit, foreign exchange, energy, raw material, labor and living necessities. To 
prevent other sectors from competing for these low-price resources with heavy industry, 
China adopted a planned resource allocation system which resulted in the emergence of 
institutions of state and public ownership and the "People's Commune" (Lin 1994). The 
establishment of the People's Commune system (a collective farming system) in rural 
areas and state-owned and collective industries in urban areas resulted in the socialization 
of agriculture, handicrafts, and the former capitalist sectors by 1956. A private economic 
sector was forbidden, and the socialist system of public ownership became the sole base 
for the Chinese economy. Based on the blueprint of the former Soviet Union's planning 
model, China established a highly centralized planning system (Wu 1998) in which 
mandatory plans monopolized nearly every economic activity in the nation (Zhang 1990). 
Centralization of the Chinese economy distorted resource allocation and produced 
economic imbalances between the major economic sectors in China (Zhang 1990). Since 
there were no free markets for resource allocation, micro units ( enterprise units, 
household units and other economic units on the micro level) were deprived of 
managerial autonomy in order to prevent the erosion of public properties. Within 
industries, enterprises made products under the control of government plans. The 
government controlled almost all prices, ranging from input and output quantities to the 
wage rates of workers and managers. Within the traditional rural sector under the 
institution of collective farming (since 1953), China implemented a mandatory 
agricultural products purchasing policy. This policy forced all peasants to produce and 
sell a fixed amount of food, cotton and vegetable oil to the government at fixed low 
prices. The possession of major production means by individuals and businesses outside 
of agriculture were basically forbidden (S. Li 1999). The agricultural collectives 
distributed incomes among laborers according to everyone's working efforts. However, 
according to the nature of agricultural production (long production periods and certain 
land areas), it was hard to inspect the work of every laborer. With the egalitarianism in 
the industrial sectors, the incomes of workers and peasants remained unrelated to their 
production contributions. This led to low technological efficiency due to poor working 
incentives (Lin 1994). 
7 
From an economic development perspective, the goal of the heavy industry 
orientation strategy and the governing of a centralized planning system was to control the 
allocation of scarce resources to accelerate the construction of an industrialized economy. 
Thus, industry would lead the entire economy on an accelerated development path. 
However, because the heavy industry orientation strategy abandoned the principle of 
comparative advantage (China is rich in labor force while short of capital and 
technologies), the economy failed to achieve economic efficiency due to the lack of 
competition. Thus, the healthy development of the national economy was impeded. 
8 
In the political arena, the Chinese Communist Party sought to achieve a pure 
"utopian socialism." A series of radical political and ideological campaigns were carried 
out, especially the Great Leap Forward ( 1958 to 1960) and the Cultural Revolution ( 1966 
to 1976) campaigns, in which the "Class Struggle" supplanted economic development. 
The results were disastrous. Just after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the national 
economy of China was on the verge of collapse (Kluver 1996, Yabuki 1995). GNP data 
from 1952 to 1978 indicated that although China's whole economy grew by 453.4% 
during the same time period, the consumption of Chinese people grew only by 177% 
(China Statistical Yearbook 1993). Consumption lagged behind production, and the 
economy during this period is often referred to as a shortage economy (Fan 199 1). 
During this period, China's economic growth was primarily an extensive economic 
growth due to the increase in inputs. The intensive economic growth was all but absent as 
the total factor productivity of China's state-owned industries stagnated and even 
experienced negative growth during this period (World Bank 1985). Thus, it was 
imperative that the Chinese government find a solution to resolve the economic problems 
and revitalize the economy. 
2.1.2 Reform and Opening Up Policies Since 1978 
China's economic and political reforms started in late 1978, signaled by the Third 
Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Congress that convened in 
December 1978. At the plenum, Deng Xiaoping seized leadership of the "Party Central" 
(Dang Zhong Yang, a term used ubiquitously in China, means the top leadership organ of 
9 
the Chinese Communist Party and civilian government and the People's Liberalization 
Army) and began to guide the "Reform and Opening Up" process of China, gradually 
abandoning the former planning system (Yabuki 1995). After more than twenty years of 
reform experience, China's economic reform process has developed significant 
characteristics: I) market-oriented, 2) gradual improvement and 3) from the ground-up. 
The gradual improvement process marks the significance of China's reform process when 
compared to the reforms of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European 
countries. The gradual reform process in China is evaluated in the following manners: 1) 
The reform spread from rural to urban areas; 2) "Special economic zones" were first 
established, then coastal cities and later the entire country were opened up to the outside 
world; and 3) China first developed Township-village enterprises, individual businesses, 
and private and foreign investment sectors, after the market mechanism took effect in 
these non state-owned sectors, it was introduced to the state-owned sectors; and 4) The 
reform, which initially began from reforming the micro economy by granting autonomy 
to enterprises and rural households, spread to the reforms in the resource allocation 
system and macro economy (Xin 1997). In 1992, China clearly stated the goal of the 
reform - to establish a socialist market economic system with Chinese characteristics 
(Jiang 1992). 
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2.1.3 General Review of China's Reform Process 
2.1.3.1 The Birdcage Economy (1978-1984) 
The first stage of reform began at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress 
in 1978, and this meeting turned out to be a watershed meeting (Kluver 1996, p.46). The 
Communique of the meeting endorsed Deng Xiaoping's dictum of "practice is the sole 
criterion of the truth" and legitimized a change of focus away from the "Class Struggle" 
toward economic modernization. The Party Central adopted the economic reform policies 
on enterprises and agricultural areas by providing some managerial autonomy for the 
enterprises and rural households, and raised the "Reform and Opening Up" slogan for 
economic revitalization. Ideologically, the Communique introduced new flexibility to the 
former static and unchanging Mao Zedong Thought. "If everything had to be done 
according to books and things became ossified, progress would become impossible, life 
itself would stop and the Party and country would perish" (Beijing Review, Dec. 29, 
1978, p.9-11), thus encouraging people to accept new economic and political concepts. 
During the period of 1978 to 1984, China implemented the "Household 
Responsibility System," abandoned the "People's Commune" system in rural areas, and 
carried out the system of "Fang Quan Rang Li" (Granting autonomy and benefits) in 
industrial sectors (which, in this case, refers mainly to State-owned enterprises). In early 
1979, China began to establish "special economic zones" and to formally introduce 
foreign investments (Lin 1994). Although China experienced dramatic growth in the 
economy from 1978 to 1984, especially in agricultural production (the agricultural output 
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grew more than 7% annually from 1978 to 1984, according to Shuhe Li [1999], p.5), the 
socialist economy was still recognized as a planned economy by people and the Party. In 
the spring of 1982, the vice general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chen 
Yun, announced a policy that shifted the economy toward "taking the planned economy 
as primary and market adjustment as secondary" (People's Daily, Jan. 26, 1982). The 
concept was presented analogously by likening the planned economy to a cage within 
which the market adjustment mechanism, like a bird, could fly freely, thus revitalizing 
the economy. The Chinese economy in the first half of the 1980s was directed essentially 
according to the concept of the birdcage economy: "The system of economic planning 
continued as the basis for activity, but market forces were introduced and allowed to play 
an increasingly larger adjustment role" (Yabuki 1995, p.43). 
In September 1982, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Twelfth Party 
Congress. At that meeting, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the need to "integrate the 
universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own 
and build socialism with Chinese characteristics" (Deng Xiaoping, "Opening Speech" at 
the Twelfth Party Congress, 1982 ). The general secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party, Hu Yaobang, also gave a report entitled "Create a New Situation in All Fields of 
Socialist Modernization," in which he stated that the most important task of the 
Communist Party was to lead the nation toward economic and technological 
modernization. Hu Yaobang also called for the development of a "socialist spiritual 
civilization," thus laying the groundwork for later theoretical innovation (Kluver 1996, 
p.64-65). 
12 
From 1978 through 1984, China increased its pace of implementing "Opening Up" 
policies. On July 1, 1979, the Second Plenum of the Fifth National People's Congress 
adopted the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese 
and Foreign Investment" (People's Daily, July 2, 1979). In 1980, China began to regain 
memberships in international institutions, thus opening the door to foreign capital, 
advanced technology and management experience (T. Li 1999, p.51 ). In April 1984, the 
Chinese Communist Party decided to open fourteen coastal cities to the outside world and 
to establish "economic development areas" within these cities (People's Daily, April 7, 
1984). In the same year, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed his famous statement of "one 
country, two systems" concerning the Taiwan issue and China's reversion of Hong Kong 
and Macao. 
2.1.3.2 The Planned Commodity Economy (1984-1992) 
The introduction of a market mechanism clashed directly with China's former 
centralized planning system. In October 1984, the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party 
Congress adopted the "Decision on Reform of the Economic System" and introduced a 
new concept called "Planned Commodity Economy Based on the Public Ownership." 
Therefore, "the doctrinal belief that socialism equals a planned economy was abandoned 
and replaced by the notion that socialism equals a commodity economy" (Yabuki 1995, 
p.43). However, due to the hesitations of most Chinese Communist Party members, the 
"Decision" stated that the "commodity economy" was a "Planned (Commodity) 
Economy" and reinforced the idea that the "labor force is not a commodity . . .  all state-
1 3  
owned enterprises and resources are not commodities." It was not until September 1985 
that the Communist Party allowed the gradual introduction of the market forces into the 
economy, thus laying the foundation for the development of a mature market system. 
By 1985, the negative effects of economic reform became apparent. The economy 
became overheated, and a popular resentment developed toward the new phenomenon of 
economic inequity between geographic areas and social groups, which contradicted the 
traditional egalitarianism of the former system. The simultaneous occurrence of 
corruption by officials also became an important political issue. These problems 
produced economic and sociopolitical pressures to reverse the reforms. Thus, the 
justification for reform needed to be modified to face these new challenges (Wu 1998). 
This was solved by inserting a new historical phase into the national development of 
socialism, then changing the traditional ideological understanding of people upon 
socialism (Kluver 1996). 
At the Thirteenth Party Congress which opened in October 1987, the Party's  general 
secretary, Zhao Ziyang, raised the concept of the "primary stage of socialism" (Zhao 
1988). Zhao Ziyang stated that China was only in the beginning stage of socialism, and 
because China had never gone through a stage of capitalism, the means of production had 
not been fully developed. As such, the nation had been unable to overcome the poverty 
that characterized feudalism. Hence, socialist development could only occur after the 
productive forces had been fully developed, thus necessitating some capitalistic measures 
in the primary stage of socialism. Without this intermediate phase, China was doomed to 
remain in poverty (Kluver 1996, p.78). Deng Xiaoping further divided the primary stage 
1 4  
into three steps. The first step was to double the GNP of 1980; the second stage called for 
the redoubling of the economy by 2000; and the third step included raising the per capita 
GNP equivalent to that of moderately developed countries by the middle of the 21st 
century (Xin 1997). 
By defining the "primary stage of socialism" and setting the strategy of "Three 
Steps" for economic development, the Chinese leadership redefined the ideological base 
for greater reforms. With respect to the functions and the role of the market mechanism, 
Zhao Ziyang's report stated clearly that the plans and the market held the same 
importance as "the state controls the market, and the market guides enterprises." 
Fom 1984 to 1992, China's economy experienced a rapid growth (except for three 
years after 1989). Non public-owned sectors developed at an increasingly rapid rate, 
especially the township-village enterprises in rural areas and the private economy in 
urban areas. In the external sector, the "opening of the fourteen coastal cities in 1984 
initialized the second surge of opening to the outside world" (Yabuki 1995, p.245). In 
1986, China adopted the "Foreign Capital Enterprise Law." In 1989, China 
acknowledged that it was a "net aid receiving country" (People' s  Daily, Jan. 4, 1989). In 
the state-owned sector, the Chinese government granted more autonomy. The previous 
system of delivery of enterprise profits to the state was replaced by a new system under 
which the state levied taxes on enterprise earnings, and the contract responsibility system 
and the project of "re-establishing the enterprise management system" were carried out 
(Lin 1994 ). China also began systematic reforms of resource allocation, macro policies, 
city administration and the social security system (Xin 1997, p.40). 
1 5  
But price reform (the two-track price system) induced inflation and official 
corruption, thus raising the people's resentment. Later, in May and June of 1 989, the 
resentment resulted in the Tiananmen Square Incident. In addition, the disintegration of 
the former Soviet Union impacted the Chinese Communist Party's reform efforts. The 
economy stalled in 1 989; the consequences of these events resulted in the political sphere 
tightening, and problems of unemployment and deficits of state-owned enterprises 
became increasingly serious for the government. 
2.1.3.3 The Socialist Market Economy (since 1992) 
From Jan. 1 8  to Feb. 2 1 ,  1 992, Deng Xiaoping made an inspection tour of the south 
of China, and he officially declared "important talks" to advocate a speedup of the reform 
and opening-up (Yabuki 1 995, p.259). Deng Xiaoping said, "Reform and opening up are 
the only viable road for China. Those who will not undertake reform, no matter who they 
are, have no course but to resign . . .  Even if something is capitalist there is nothing wrong 
with incorporating it in the socialist system" ("Talks by Deng Xiaoping," Chinese 
Communist Party Central Document No. 2[ 1 992], Yabuki 1 995, Appendix 1 ). In 1 992, 
the Party Central issued Document No.2, Document No. 4 "Opening cities along the 
Yangtze River and border cities" and Document No. 5 "Developing tertiary industries," 
thereby concretely accelerating the paces of reform and opening-up. In October 1 992, the 
Chinese Communist Party convened the Fourteenth Party Congress. General secretary 
Jiang Zemin gave a report titled "Accelerating Reform and Opening Up" and raised the 
concept of the "socialist market economy" for the first time in the Chinese history. He 
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said, "it is the task of the Congress to mobilize all party comrades and the people of all 
nationalities to achieve still greater successes in building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics by further emancipating their minds and seizing this opportune moment to 
quicken the pace of reform, the opening to the outside world and the drive for 
modernization" (Jiang 1992). By calling for the establishment of the "socialist market 
economy with diversified ownership structure," Jiang Zemin freed China's  economy to 
pursue market forces, and completely abandoned the outdated concept that a planned 
economy means socialism and a market economy capitalism. 
In November 1993, Jiang Zemin gave a speech named "Decision on Some Issues 
Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure" at the Third 
Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress. In the same year, "the socialist market 
economy" was written into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (T. Li 
1999). 
In September 1995, the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress adopted the 
"Suggestion of Making the 'Ninth-five Year' Plan and 2010 Long-term Goals for 
National Economy and Social Development." In this document, the Party decided to 
complete the transformation of China's economy to the market economy by the year 
2010. The Party also set the standard for later reform policies: " . . .  to judge the correctness 
of a policy is whether it was beneficial in developing productive forces, whether it is 
advantageous in strengthening overall national power, and whether it is effective in 
raising people's living standards." The former "Three Steps" strategy was also modified. 
As of 1995, the goal of redoubling the GNP of 1980 was finished, the second step was 
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modified to be "redoubling per capita GNP of 1980 by the end of 2000. By the end of the 
year 20 I 0, the GNP of 2000 will double under the condition that the population increases 
by 300 million from year 1980 to 2000." (Liberalization Daily, Oct. 5, 1995) 
China has carried out intensive reform policies since 1992. The economy is 
expanding at an accelerated pace. In the area of state-owned enterprises, establishing a 
modem enterprise system was focused on, along with the introduction of share holding 
ownership reform. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets were 
established. In addition, China allowed the privatization and renting of some state-owned 
enterprises. In the private sectors, China amended the Constitution to acknowledge the 
private sector's legal status (Roberts 1999, p.74). The development of the private sectors 
since 1992 has been dramatic. In rural areas, China advocated the development of rural 
industry and extended the "Household Responsibility System." In the external field in 
1992, China opened all principal cities and regions of China to the outside. In China 
today, only Tibet lacks an open city. Since 1993 , a series ofreforms were carried out in 
the macroeconomic and sociopolitical areas which covered financial, fiscal, investment 
and social security systems. 
China is now engaged in the structural transformation toward a market system. 
However, because of the structural rigidities left over from the former economic system, 
problems have developed and become serious, such as the deficits of the state-owned 
enterprises and the resulting unemployment problem, as well as the official corruption. 
These issues are of great concern to the Chinese leadership. 
18  
2.1.4 Specific Issues 
2.1.4.1 Rural Reforms 
There have been two important reforms in the rural sector since the late 1970s. The 
first includes the implementation of the "Household Responsibility System" (HRS). The 
HRS gives the right to use land resources to every rural household. Every household is 
given the freedom to farm, to raise cash crops and livestock, and to engage in non­
agricultural business after the household has met the state purchasing quotas under 
contract for grains, cotton and vegetable oil plants. With the implementation of this new 
system, the problem of the "lack of working incentive" in the former "People's 
Commune" system has been solved. From the beginning of the reform, the Chinese 
government did not intend actually to allow such reform. However, in the winter of 1978, 
a few collectives secretly, with the implied consent of local government, implemented the 
new system. After one year, the production of these collectives increased dramatically. In 
1979 and 1980, the central government permitted this new system to be adopted within 
the poorest regions of China. As the general reform process gained forwarding 
momentum, it was affirmed as a basic state policy and named the "Household 
Responsibility System." For the first time, China allowed peasants to have land tenure 
rights for 15 years, which means that the household holds the property rights to the land 
and has the freedom to plant what they like after finishing the state contract quotas for 15 
years. By the end of 1984, most of the peasant households in China employed this new 
system (94% according to the research of Bela Balassa [1987], p.410--426). Since 1978, 
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the Chinese government raised agricultural prices, reduced purchasing quotas and 
gradually liberalized the prices. The former "People's Commune system was abandoned" 
( S. Li 1999, p.5). 
Since the early 1990s, in order to induce peasants to carry out land augmenting 
investments, the Chinese government has focused on optimizing the HRS system. In 
1997, the central government permitted the land tenure period to be prolonged by another 
30 years after the current period expires, thus ensuring the sustained rapid growth of 
agriculture ( Jiang 1997). 
In response to the reform, the production of all crops grew at an unprecedented rate. 
From 1978 to 1984, the growth rate for agricultural value-added was five times what it 
had been over the previous two decades (Perkins 1994, p.26). The average annual growth 
rate of the agriculture output from 1978 to 1984 reached 7% (S. Li 1999, p.5). Within this 
period, the implementation of the HRS contributed nearly 47% to the growth of the 
agricultural production since the new system greatly raised working enthusiasm (Lin 
1994, p.124). From 1978 to 1997, grain output rose from 304.77 to 494.171 million tons, 
meat output rose from 10.025 to 51.521 million tons and aquatic products output rose 
from 4.655 to 36.0178 million tons. The per capita annual net income of rural households 
rose from 133.6 RMB¥ in 1978 to 2090.1 RMB¥ in 1997 (China Statistical Yearbook 
1998, p.325, 403, 412). By using 7% of the world's cultivated land, China feeds more 
than 22% of the population in the world (Xin 1997, p.91). 
The second area of rural reform focuses on the development of rural industry: the 
Township-village Enterprises (TVEs). In 1984, the Chinese Communist Party and the 
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State Council jointly issued the "Report on Creating a New Situation in Commune­
Brigade Enterprises." The report renamed the commune-brigade enterprises as 
"Township-village Enterprises" and relaxed restrictions on collective businesses while 
allowing private businesses to operate outside of agriculture (S. Li 1997, p.6). Because 
the HRS system brought about large, newly created resources and because of the gradual 
liberalization of the resource allocation system, the TVEs were provided with raw 
materials and markets for rapid development. Since the mid 1980s, the TVEs have 
become a more and more important propulsive force for economic development. In 1996, 
one fifth of tax revenue, one third of GDP and one third of the total exports came from 
TVEs. Since TVEs have become an important mechanism for absorption of surplus labor 
in the rural areas, they have changed the employment structure in China's rural areas. In 
1996, all TVEs employed more than 130 million laborers. In 1997, TVEs comprised 
more than one third of rural household incomes and 80% of collective capital reserves. 
TVEs have invested more than 150 billion RMB¥ in rural development and intend to 
increase their share in the total national production (People's Daily, Nov. 5, 1998). 
Although reforms in rural areas have had great success, they have also freed a large 
segment of the rural population from agriculture. This has resulted in a rural to urban 
migration problem. As a result, the employment problem in China's urban areas has 
become more complicated. Since 1995, China has called for more intensive development 
of agriculture and TVEs, with the goal to make the rural population "leave the soil, but 
not leave the rural area." 
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2.1.4.2 Reform of State-owned Enterprises (SO Es) 
Since SO Es are the pillar of public ownership, reform in this area is of greater 
importance than that of others. The reform of SO Es began at the micro fields. From 1978 
to 1984, SO Es were given some managerial power with the establishment of relationship 
between the incomes of laborers and their work performance. The goal was to improve 
work incentives. SO Es were also allowed to retain a certain portion of profits within their 
control. Step by step, SOEs were given the power to decide their own production and 
investment strategies (Balassa 1987). With the introduction of material incentives, the 
output of SOEs grew from 328.918 billion RMB¥ in 1978 to 526.27 billion RMB¥ in 
1984 (China Statistical Yearbook 1991, p.356). 
As SO Es are embedded in external institutions of the former planning economy, the 
reform in this area is more complex than that in rural areas. In 1984, China began 
carrying out a series of reforms on SOEs, trying to increase their vitality. With the fast 
development of non state-owned sectors, represented by TVEs, which had higher 
efficiency than SOEs, more and more scarce resources flowed into the non state-owned 
economy. This placed increased pressures on the SOEs to raise productivity. Since 1984, 
China has gradually reduced the quota of the mandatory plan, and with the introduction 
of the "Two-track" price system, SOEs were given more and more management 
flexibility. The previous system of delivery of profits to the state was replaced by a new 
system that levied state taxes on SOEs' earnings. A "management responsibility system" 
was implemented which aimed to "strengthen the financial relationship between SOEs 
and the state, and to establish the independent status of SOEs" (Zhang 1990, p.38). 
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Reforming SOEs requires systematic reforms in both economic and sociopolitical areas. 
Since the mid 1980s, China carried out the reforms of the city administration, the 
resource allocation system, the price system, etc. 
Since 1987, the reform of SO Es has focused on establishing an "enterprises 
management system." The ownership and managing rights of SO Es were separated in 
order that the SOEs could be run more efficiently without government intervention. The 
managers of SO Es were given more power in the SO Es' affairs. They also bore the 
responsibilities for enterprises' profits and losses (Lin 1994, p. 130-132). The goal was to 
make SOEs more competitive in the increasingly market driven economy and to increase 
their productivity. The "Decision" of the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress 
stated that SOEs experiencing continuing losses could be closed down. Contract and 
leasing systems were introduced to the SOE sector after 1987. 
Although the production of SO Es continued to grow, more and more problems arose. 
Due to the lack of cooperation of the reforms in the macro fields, such as price reform 
and sociopolitical reforms, and due to the blur of the property right of SO Es and their 
poor management, many enterprises suffered deficits. The problems of the erosion of 
public-owned property and rent-seeking behavior of some officials increased. In addition, 
after 1989, the unemployment problem of the SOEs' staff and workers became serious. 
Since 1992, as China extended the reform process toward market orientation, the 
reform of SO Es entered into a new stage. The "Decision" of the Third Plenum of the 
Fourteenth Party Congress called for the establishment of a "Modern Enterprise System 
Based on the Public Ownership." Since 1992, the Chinese government comprehensively 
implemented the reform of the "Share Holding Ownership System" to SO Es. China 
established two stock exchange markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen. According to the 
principle of "Zhua Da Fang Xiao" (focusing on large scale SOEs and freeing medium 
and small scale SOEs completely to the markets), China has allowed privatization of 
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SO Es and collective enterprises. The government has begun the reorganization of large 
scale SOEs into stock holding companies. The state has concentrated on 1000 large-scale 
key enterprises and strategic SO Es (Xin 1997, p. 119). Reforms such as mergers, 
restructuring, cooperation, leases, selling to collectives or individuals and closing SOEs 
have been allowed since 1992. Because of the great shock of the economic transition, 
China has experienced serious deficit problems surrounding SOEs and unemployment 
(underemployment). According to the Y. Lin, F. Cai and Z. Li[ 1994](p. 134), about one 
third of the SO Es encountered explicit losses in 1992; one third experienced implicit 
insolvency problems. In 1997, the registered unemployed and the "Off-position" (a 
specific term used in China which stands for people who lack work because of the 
financial problems of the SOEs) workers in urban areas reached 17.7 million people 
(China Statistical Yearbook 1998, p. 127, Hu 1998, p. 5). 
2.1.4.3 The Development of Non Public-owned Sectors 
Public ownership was once considered the cornerstone of China's socialist economy. 
Since 1978, three important modifications to the ownership structure were made in 
China. In the early 1980s, the Communist Party acknowledged that the ownership 
structure of China was "Public ownership is the base, with non-public ownership as a 
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supplement." In 1984, it was amended to state that "non-public ownership is a beneficial 
supplement," and the "Decision" of 1984 raised the principle of "Actively develop the 
diversified ownership based on the public ownership." ( T. Li, 1999) In 1997, the 
Fifteenth Party Congress acknowledged the important role of non-public ownership and 
stated that it is a principal economic regulation that diversified ownership economies co­
develop with public ownership (T. Li 1999, p.46). All of these legitimized the 
institutional base for freeing non public-owned sectors of the Chinese economy. 
The non public-owned sectors in China consist of three parts: a) foreign investment 
enterprises, b) private enterprises, and c) individual industrial and commercial operations. 
At the beginning of the reform process, these sectors contributed very little to the total 
industrial output, but by 1997 they accounted for about 36.4% (China Statistical 
Yearbook 1998, p.433). They "now provide some less than half of the GDP of China" (S. 
Li 1999, p.3) and can even be recognized as the best hope to fuel future economic growth 
(Roberts 1999, p.74). 
China began to introduce foreign investments in the late 1970s by establishing four 
"special economic zones" (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen; in the late 1980s, 
Hainan Province and Pudong District of Shanghai were also opened as special economic 
zones) and adopted the "Joint-venture Law." In 1979, the Foreign Investment 
Management Committee of China and the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation were established to actively introduce foreign investment. Since 1980, China 
regained memberships in almost all international institutions. In 1980, China became a 
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member of the IMF, the World Bank, the International Development Association, and the 
International Finance Corporation. In 1986, China entered the Asian Development Bank. 
In the 1980s, China's leadership realized the globalization trend of the economy. 
They also realized that the greatest obstacles to China's modernization were "lack of 
capital and backwardness of technology and management" (Yabuki 1994, p. 246). To 
overcome these obstacles, China increased the pace of economic reform in the 1980s and 
1990s. In 1984, fourteen coastal cities were opened to the outside world; in 1986, the 
"Foreign Capital Enterprise Law" was adopted and preferential treatments were granted 
to absorb foreign investment. In 1992, China opened all the principal cities and regions 
(except Tibet) and implemented a "multi-directional, multi-strata" opening up policy. 
In regard to the development of the internal non public-owned sectors, in 1981, the 
Chinese government recognized the existence of "individual industrial and commercial 
operations." The "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," adopted in 1982, 
declared the legal status of this private sector. In the 1988 emendation of the Constitution, 
the legal status of private enterprises was acknowledged (X. Li 1990, p.6). Under 
encouragement from the Chinese leadership to "get rich ahead of others" and 
abandonment of former egalitarianism, the private and individual sectors developed 
rapidly. In 1999, private property rights were spelled out as a legal right in the amended 
Constitution (Roberts 1999, p. 7 4 ). 
The non public-owned sectors are becoming an important force in the Chinese 
economy. From 1978 to 1997, the total amount of foreign capital actually used in China 
accumulated U.S.$ 348.348 billion; in 1997, about 46.95% of the imports and exports 
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were made by the foreign investment enterprises. At the end of 1997, these non public­
owned sectors employed about 3 1  % of the employed staff and workers in China's  urban 
areas (China Statistical Yearbook 1998, p .130, 63 5-637) .  Non public-owned sectors also 
provide important contributions to the state revenue. Since they behave according to the 
rules of the market mechanism, their development is beneficial to the reform of the 
economic system and to the adjustment of the economic structure. 
2.1.4.4 Reform of Resource Allocation System and Macro Fields 
Since China carried out the reform on the micro fields in the late 1970s, the 
improvement in the production and the autonomy of the micro units required reforms in 
the former rigid resource allocation system and macro managing fields. From 1979, 
China began reform in these areas: 
< A >. Materials Managing System 
Since 1979, China began to reform the former centralized planning materials 
allocation system. Reform policies granted autonomy on management and retaining 
profits to the enterprises. The right to sell products was gradually granted to the 
enterprises and rural households. The previously planned allocated materials were 
replaced by market allocation. Many free markets for production means were established 
in different regions. The government also reduced the scope of the planned prices on 
materials, and instead began using "guiding prices" (prices set by the government that 
only gave price signals to the market transactions) to guide the production of the 
enterprises. From 1980 to 1988, the number of categories of the state controlled materials 
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declined from 256 to 27. Materials previously allocated by ministries of the State Council 
were reduced from 316 to 45 categories. By the early 1990s, almost all state allocated 
factor inputs and materials were transferred to the market allocation system. (Lin 1994, 
p. 136) 
< B >. Financial System 
Before the reform, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) was the only bank in China. 
Thus, the first goal of the banking reform policies in China was to establish a banking 
system. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of policy banks (banks which carry out 
business under government dictation instead of the profit motive) and financial institutes 
were set up. These included the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the People's Construction Bank of China, and 
the People's Insurance Company of China. The PBOC was reorganized to function as the 
central bank. During the same period, collectively owned banks and credit and trust 
institutions boomed in China. Different types of financial markets like the National Debt 
market, the Bonds market, the Future market and the Stock Exchange markets were also 
set up. The "Decision" of the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1993 
called for further reform in the banking system. The policy banks were under 
transformation to be the first "specialty banks" and later to become commercial banks 
that pursue profits and are responsible for investment risks. Modem monetary policy 
tools such as open market operations and discount rate policies were actively introduced 
to stabilize the value of the currency. A foreign exchange market was established in 
Shanghai. Foreign banks were allowed to set branches in China. A market-based floating 
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exchange rate system was under construction with RMB (Chinese currency) gradually to 
be made convertible. (Lin 1994) 
In the government financial system and the fiscal system, under the direction of the 
premier Zhu Rongji, reform policies of "macro adjustment and control" (Yabuki 1995, 
p. 128) have been carried out since 1994. A new divided taxation system was adopted 
which separated the collection and management of central government taxes and local 
government taxes. A value-added tax was introduced, and for certain commodities and 
non-commodity activities, a sales tax and a gross receipts tax were imposed. Government 
expenditures were also put under strict control. 
< C >. Price Reform 
During 1978-1984, China reformed the price system by adjusting the relative prices 
of commodities and raw materials. This meant that the government had to raise the prices 
of highly demanded products and reduce the prices of commodities in excess supply. 
Since 1985, the market mechanism was introduced to the price system with a "two­
track" system. Under the "two-track" system, each product had two prices: a government 
planned price if the product was in the quota of the centralized plan, and another price 
formed by the market force if it was out of the government planning system. As the 
reform process guides the Chinese economy more and more toward a market-oriented 
direction, the effects of the "planning track" have gradually reduced. In 1999, the reform 
of the price formation mechanism on commodities was basically completed. Now China 
focuses on the reform of market adjustment of prices for the factors of production. (T. Li 
1999, p.49) 
2.2 The Reforms of the Employment and Migration Control Policies of China 
This section is based on the discussion of several articles on Chinese employment 
and migration policies. 7 
2.2.1 Employment Policies in China's Urban Areas 
2.2.1.1 Pre 1978 Era 
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China implemented a highly centralized system of employment before 1978. In order 
to maintain social security and pursue the pure socialism based on public ownership, 
China implemented a "unified allocation" system for labor allocation. Under the principle 
of public ownership, the means of production are jointly owned by all people in the 
country within the whole-people ownership form, or by all workers of the enterprises and 
collective units within the collective ownership. Ownership is equally divided among all 
people under the direction of the state. Every able bodied person in a socialist society 
should work to receive the income, and the income distribution is based on an 
individual's contribution to production. Because everyone has claim to the ownership of 
the factors of production, he or she has the legal right to participate in production 
activities and receive payment for his or her contribution to the production. In turn, 
everyone has the right to be employed. Thus, it is logical and necessary that a socialist 
economy should achieve "full employment." 
7. Goldstein [ 1 996], Davin [ 1 999], Solinger [ 1 999], White [ 1988] and World Bank [ 1985], etc. 
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China carried out a heavy industry orientation strategy and pursued pure socialism 
under a centralized planning system in the 1950s. As a consequence, the state planning 
system governed the urban employment field, which resulted in a rigid unified labor 
allocation system. This system was called the "unified recruiting and unified allocation" 
system, and it covered almost all of the urban labor force. Within this system, all new 
laborers were dispatched to particular jobs, "with little attention to their preferences or 
the preferences of employers" (World Bank 1985, p. 131). The job assignment was for 
life. "Along with this system of administrative allocation evolved a system of job tenure, 
the workers had the right to remain in their enterprises for life and had the privilege to 
access certain welfare benefits like free medical care, housing, child-care, pensions and 
guaranteed jobs for their children" (White 1988, p. 184). Workers could not move from 
one enterprise to another except in rare instances; for example, a worker might be 
assigned or promoted to a new position by the state or local governments. Enterprises 
were not permitted to recruit and dismiss workers "even if they had more employees than 
they needed and if some were habitually absent, lazy or negligent" (World Bank 1985, 
p. 131). 
In order to realize rapid growth in industrialization, especially in heavy industry, and 
because of the great burden to provide employment for an expanding working population, 
China adopted a rigid wage policy as part of its industrial development strategy. The 
wage scales were centrally determined and varied among occupations, industries and 
localities. Bonuses, piecework and other paying schemes were prohibited. There was an 
egalitarianism of the income and welfare distribution among all employees. The job 
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position in urban areas, especially in state-owned enterprises, was referred to at that time 
as an " iron rice bowl"(White 1 988). 
According to the rigid systems in the pre-reform era, the resultant overmanning and 
immobility impeded the flexibility of a dynamic economy. In addition to the other effects 
of the planning system, there came the low efficiency in resource allocation, production 
and low worker morale. By committing to the socialist goal of full employment, the 
Chinese government "converted open unemployment into 'unemployment on the job' in 
both state and collective sectors" (White 1 988, p . 1 85) and adopted strict control policies 
on the internal migration of the population. 
2.2.1 .2 Reform of Employment Policies 
Reaching "full employment" is a principle of a socialist system. Because workers 
depended on the enterprises for medical care, housing, pensions and other welfare, and 
because prior to 1 990 there was no unemployment insurance system in China, the 
reforms of the employment policies were carried out with caution. 
China began the reform process in late 1 978, aiming to revitalize the economy and 
increase production and productivity. The government found it necessary to reform the 
former rigid labor allocation and wage policies. The first step toward reforming 
employment policies was introduced in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s. Enterprises were 
gradually granted autonomy to offer material incentives to workers, such as bonuses and 
piecework to counter the problem of low morale and low efficiency. "Regulations on the 
Work of Factory Managers in State-Owned Factories" was issued by the State Council in 
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1982. This document gave factory managers the authority to raise wages one percent per 
year. Later, in May of 1984, the scale was raised to three percent, and enterprises were 
given "full sovereignty in the method of distributing bonuses; further, 'floating wage' 
schemes and position-related allowances were left to the discretion of the enterprises" 
(Yabuki 1995, p.76). 
From 1984 on, China began to carry out a systematic reform on the industrial sector. 
To accompany this process, which aimed to reform the enterprises into independent 
production and operation units, the State Council issued several documents in 1985 and 
1986, further broadening the independence and sovereignty of enterprises in wage 
determination. In 1988, the "State-owned Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of 
China" was adopted, which for the first time legalized the enterprises' right over internal 
distribution. 
Gradually, the Chinese government transferred control of wage determination to the 
state-owned and collective enterprises. The goal was to realize "a flexible, less egalitarian 
wage system in which demand and supply as well as individual contributions to 
production would play a greater role in determining the earnings of particular employees 
and occupations" (World Bank 1985, p. 134 ). 
Establishing the sovereignty of enterprises in the area of labor allocation is also an 
essential part of enterprise reform. If the enterprises do not have authority over wage 
determination and labor recruiting and dismissing, then it will be impossible for them to 
become responsible for profits and losses, which is the core of enterprise reform. Since 
the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, a series of labor allocation reform 
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policies were carried out. In 1980, the Party Central and the State Council issued the 
"Three Combinations" policy, encouraging laborers to establish small urban collective 
enterprises and to engage in self-employed commercial and industrial operations. In the 
same year, China began experimenting with a new "labor contract" system in some areas. 
In 198 1, the "Decisions on Solving the Urban Employment Problems" was issued, which 
called for breaking the "iron rice bowl" and job tenure and introduced diversified labor 
allocation channels outside of state plans. The enterprises were, step by step, granted 
autonomy to evaluate and choose individual workers within the numerical quota assigned 
by state and local labor bureaus (Wang 1994, p.265). Since the early 1980s, the right to 
dismiss unsatisfactory workers has been granted to enterprises. By raising the notions of 
"Planned Commodity Economy" and "the Primary State of Socialism," the former 
Marxist principle which states that labor power is not a commodity in the socialist system 
was abandoned, thus providing more flexibility to reform the rigid labor allocation 
system. 
On September 9, 1986, the State Council issued four regulations on labor allocation 
reform. These regulations abandoned the former fixed job tenure, and instead 
implemented a comprehensive "labor contract" system. The laborers were allowed to 
choose jobs that they preferred and were encouraged to move between enterprises and 
work outside state-owned and collective sectors. As the reform process moved more and 
more toward a market-oriented direction, the private sectors, for example, foreign 
invested enterprises, and previously proscribed commercial and service sectors developed 
quickly, creating new opportunities for job seekers. Laborers employed by non public-
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owned sectors grew dramatically in the 1980s. In 1978, only about 0. 15% of the urban 
labor force was employed outside of the state-owned and collective sectors, but in 1989, 
the percentage changed to about 5.42% (China Statistical Yearbook 1998, p. 130-131). It 
is obvious that along with the reform process, China's urban employment underwent a 
structural change, labor circulation increased, and a labor market subject to free market 
forces was under construction. All of these contributed to the dynamism of the economic 
development. 
Albeit great freedom was granted to enterprises and individuals, the most serious 
problem of China's labor allocation system, the overmanning of the public-owned 
enterprises, especially in state-owned factories, was difficult to solve. Under the former 
rigid system, China kept unemployment within enterprises. This resulted in a high level 
of underemployment. If all workers who were not needed for production were allowed to 
be dismissed by enterprises, there inevitably would be widespread unemployment. This 
outcome is counter to the "full employment" commitment of the Chinese government and 
would result in the risk of sociopolitical instability. So, for Chinese state-owned and 
collective enterprises, dismissing unneeded workers was principally forbidden. Even after 
China declared its reform policy to transform its economy into a "socialist market 
economy" and carried out reforms of "establishing the Modem Enterprises System" and 
the social security system in the early 1990s, workers of closed down enterprises and 
unneeded employees of those enterprises with serious financial problems were included 
only into the "off-position" population. This meant workers lacked work but the former 
enterprises still provided their necessities. As China deepens the market oriented reform 
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and further restructures the economy, the problems of unemployment in China's urban 
areas will remain or become even more serious. According to the data of the State 
Statistical Bureau, about 22 million surplus enterprise workers within China's urban areas 
need to be reallocated. In addition, the immigration population from rural areas and 
young urban job seekers entering the work force increase. There is a heavy burden on the 
Chinese government to increase employment opportunities (Xin 1 997, p.379-380). Since 
the early 1 990s, the Chinese government urged the establishment of an unemployment 
insurance system. At the same time, the government accelerated the development of non 
public-owned economies and the service sectors with the intent that these new sectors 
would have great potential to create productive jobs. The current goal of China's urban 
employment reform policies is "to establish a competitive labor market, which adjusts 
labor demand and supply through the market mechanism, to establish a mature 
unemployment insurance system, and to control the urban unemployment rate below 4% 
at the end of the year 2000" (Xin 1997, p.389). 
2.2.2 Reform of the Migration Control Policies 
From the early 1 950s to 1978, China implemented a restrictive migration control 
policy called the "hukou" (Household Registration) system. This system resulted from 
China's focus on the development of heavy industry. A significant division between 
urban and rural areas appeared as a result of these policies. "China's vast rural population 
not only endured a standard of living far below that in the urban sector, they were also 
denied access to many social welfare benefits" (Wang 1 999). Urban laborers had 
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guaranteed lifetime employment and many benefits, including free medical care, pensions 
and housing, etc. In contrast, life in rural areas was risky and fluctuated with the 
production of crops. Although the Chinese government considered urbanization essential 
to economic development, it controlled urban growth to avoid the undesirable conditions 
of urbanization exhibited in other countries, such as great strain on urban infrastructure, 
the development of slums and massive urban unemployment. To maintain the huge rural 
population within the non-urban areas, since the early 1950s, China has carried out 
various migration control policies. By issuing the "Regulations of Household Registration 
of the People's Republic of China" in 1958, China established "perhaps the strictest 
system, the 'hukou' system of migration control in the modem world" (Davin 1999, p.5). 
Under the system, each household and its members were categorized through an 
"agricultural" or "non-agricultural" residence status, and people were confined to reside 
and work only where they had their "hukou. " Transferring residence status was granted 
only in certain circumstances, such as marriage or graduating from college. Movement 
from rural to urban areas was extremely difficult, but urban-rural migration was 
encouraged; during the time period of the "Cultural Revolution" (1966--1976), about 17 
million young high school graduates and students were rusticated to the countryside and 
mountain regions (Reynolds 1988, p.190). Moreover, before the early 1980s, even 
temporary sojourns in the cities were strictly controlled. Visitors had to register at the 
local Public Security Bureau for any stay longer than three days. Because of the rigid 
rationing system of foods and housing in urban areas, immigrants could not find 
employment and accommodation. 
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These migration control policies effectively restrained a vast population to China's 
rural areas. However, as the inequality between rural and urban areas grew, people in the 
countryside were eager to seek a better life and greater economic opportunities in urban 
areas. With the introduction of the reform policies, the Household Registration System 
began losing its effectiveness. 
Following the reforms beginning in late 1978, especially the dismantling of the 
former "People's Commune" system and the implementation of the "Household 
Responsibility" system, vast numbers of peasants were freed from agricultural work and 
encouraged to engage in non-agricultural activities. As a consequence, the rural industry 
of China (Township-village Enterprises) developed rapidly, but they could not provide 
sufficient jobs for the huge surplus of rural labor. Since a large population of young 
laborers entered the rural labor force each year, it was impossible for the Chinese 
government to forbid them to migrate to the urban and more developed areas as China 
gradually liberalized its economy. Also, in China's urban areas, reform policies 
stimulated economic growth, and diversified economies, such as private and foreign 
invested enterprises, grew rapidly since the mid 1980s. In addition to the reform of the 
labor allocation system, the motivation for migration grew stronger for rural and urban 
laborers. "As urbanites increasingly opted for jobs in new sectors, state firms became 
pressed to find substitute labor. In addition, a vast variety of low-tech jobs in building 
and services called out for casual workers" (Solinger 1999, p.199). Thus, a huge army of 
surplus rural labor obviously became the source of a cheap labor supply. 
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Under these conditions, China gradually reformed its migration control policies. In 
1985, the Ministry of Public Security of China issued a regulation on temporary residence 
certificates for the urban areas. Migrant workers with certificates were allowed to live in 
the destination areas but could not enjoy the social benefits to which permanent urban 
residents were entitled. Migration was therefore, grew significantly. In 1986, regulations 
to establish a system of identity cards were implemented, which encouraged the 
reasonable movement of the labor force. The relaxation on migration control and the 
rapid economic growth created a great population flow. Although urban and rural 
migration increased, the flow from rural areas was much greater and "the typical migrant 
was a young peasant from west or central China seeking employment in an urban area 
either within his/her own province or in the rapidly developing areas of coastal 
China"(Davin 1999, p.38). Because the migrants lacked permanent residence status, they 
were categorized as a "floating population" (unofficial residents). Estimates about the 
size of the "floating population" varied largely. Some accounts say only 40 million, some 
estimate 80 million, and some claim even more than l 00 million. One credible estimate is 
about 50 million in the early 1990s (China Daily, Mar. 3, 1994). 
Migrants provided cheap labor and lifted large rural population out of poverty and 
contributed to China's fast economic growth. However, according to the current 
developing level of the Chinese economy, it was impossible for the Chinese government 
to abandon the former "hukou" system and completely allow the people to make their 
own decisions concerning migration. China is sensitive to social chaos and disorders that 
may result from the economic and sociopolitical transformation process. Especially since 
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1993, following the restructuring of China's economy toward a market system, the 
serious problem of unemployment in urban areas arose. Only after China has successfully 
established the socialist market system should it be seen as the elapse of the Household 
Registration system and other migration control policies. 
2.3 Summary 
China began its reform at the micro level, following a gradual market oriented 
direction. Since late 1978, rural households and urban enterprises were given some 
managerial autonomy with the establishment of relationship between the incomes of 
laborers and their working efforts with the intent to improve working incentives. Also, 
enterprises were allowed to retain a certain proportion of profits within their control, and 
they gradually became independent production and financial units that were responsible 
for all losses and profits. 
The improvement in firm incentives created a new stream of resources. On one hand, 
the allocation of newly created resources by autonomous firm management prompted for 
reforms in the resource allocation mechanism and macro areas. On the other hand, the 
induced relaxation and reform of the rigid planned resource allocation system allowed the 
newly generated resources to be allocated to the sectors that had been suppressed under 
the traditional economic system. Thus, the economic structure improved and the growth 
rate accelerated. Because the economic reforms increased the firm profit rates and the 
state's tax revenue collection without harming benefits of any vested-interest group, the 
reforms enjoyed overall support and became irreversible. When the reforms proceeded to 
40 
the macro areas, China had the ability to compensate the losers of the macro reforms. 
Therefore, the macro reforms were carried out without disruption. Such a gradual reform 
progress gave the society continuous opportunities for making choices. This method 
allowed China to maintain a balance between speed and stability during the process of 
reforms and prevent the occurrence of political radicalism and social shocks that were 
suffered by the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. 
In regard to the employment in China's urban areas following the reform process, 
obvious structural changes occurred as the economic structure diversifies and the 
government relaxes the former rigid migration control system. Within these changes, the 
change of the ownership structure is especially significant. This change will be the focus 
of discussion in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III. Empirical Data Analysis 
As a result of China's reform process, i.e., the economic transformation toward the 
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, employment in China's urban 
areas has undergone structural changes. This chapter will present an analysis on this 
change based on empirical data. The unemployment problem in China's urban areas will 
also be addressed. 
3.1 Definition of Terms 
All data used in the analysis are cited and calculated from the data in the 1 990, 1 991  
and 1 998 China Statistical Yearbook. To begin the analysis, the following terms should 
first be defined. 
( l  ). Urban area: In China, an urban area consists of both cities and towns. City refers to 
cities established with the approval of the central government; town refers to towns 
established with the approval of the provincial, autonomous regional or municipal 
governments directly under the central government. Ordinarily, a town is an area 
with more than 3000 permanent residents, of which seventy percent or more are from 
a non-agricultural population. A town may also be an area with more than 2500 but 
less than 3000 permanent residents, of which eighty-five percent or more are from 
a non-agricultural population. (China Statistical Yearbook 1990, p. 1 08) 
(2). ULF (Urban labor force): Refers to the population aged sixteen and over in 
urban areas who are available for employment. The ULF includes those both 
participating in and desirous to participate in the economic activities, including the 
employed and unemployed population. 
(3). LSI :  Staff and workers employed by state-owned industries in China's 
urban areas. In China, state-owned industries refer to state-owned mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water production and supply 
industries. 
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( 4 ). LOS : Refers to staff and workers employed by all state-owned units, except the 
state-o\\'ned industries, in China's urban areas. It includes people employed in 
state-owned construction, transport, storage, telecommunications, banking and 
insurance, social services, education and government agencies, etc. (China statistical 
Year book 1 998, p. 1 3  8) 
(5). LS : Staff and workers employed by total state-owned units in the urban areas. 
(6). LUC: Staff and workers employed by collectively owned units in China's urban 
areas. A collectively owned unit constitutes the collective enterprises and institutions 
run by cities, towns and subdistrict offices. 
(7). LP: Staff and workers employed by public-owned units in the urban areas. 
(8). LO: Staff and workers employed by non public-owned units in the urban areas. 
(9). UE: Staff and workers employed in China's urban areas. 
( 1 0). UUNEM (Registered unemployed persons in the urban areas) :  Refers to 
persons who have a non-agricultural residence, fall within the range of working age, 
are capable to labor, and are unemployed but desirous to be employed and have 
been registered at the local employment service agencies to apply for jobs. 
( 1 1 ) .  UERATE (Registered unemployment rate in urban areas): Refers to the ratio 
of the number of registered unemployed persons to the sum of the number of 
employed persons and the registered unemployed persons in China's urban areas. 
(1 2). RULF: Registered labor force in the urban areas. It is calculated by dividing 
registered unemployment rate in urban areas into the number of the registered 
unemployment persons in urban areas. 
The relationships among these terms are: 
LS=LSI+LOS 
UE=LP+LO 
RULF=UUNEM/UERA TE 
3.2 Data and Sources 
LP=LS+LUC 
ULF=UE+UUNEM 
According to the terms defined above, Table 3. 1 is established based on the data in 
the China Statistical Yearbook 1990 (p. 1 13, 1 30), 1991 (p.76-87, 97) and 1998 (p.127-
13 1 ,  138-14 1 ). The measuring units for LSI, LOS, LS, LUC, LP, LO, UE. UUNEM, 
RULF and ULF are 10,000 persons per unit. 
The Chinese government sources for the data reported in Table 3 . 1  are: the 
Department of Population and Employment Statistics of China State Statistical Bureau, 
the Department of Overall Planning and Wages of Ministry of Labor and the General 
Office of State Administration for Industry and Commerce (China Statistical Yearbook 
1998, p . 125). 
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Table 3.1: Data of Em�lo;yment in China's Urban Areas (1978--1997} 
YEAR LSI LOS LS LUC LP LO UE UUNEM UERA TE RULF ULF DIFF 
( l} �22 (32 {4) �52 (6} (72 (82 (92 ( 102 ( l Q �12) 
1978 3 1 39 43 1 2  745 1 2048 9499 15  95 1 4  530.0 0.053 10000.000 1 0044.0 44.0 
1979 3208 4485 7693 2274 9967 32 9999 567.6 0.054 105 1 1 . 1 1 1  10566.6 55.5 
1980 3334 4685 80 19 2425 1 0444 8 1  10525 54 1 .5 0.049 1 105 1.020 1 1066.5 1 5 .5 
1 98 1  3488 4884 8372 2568 10940 1 1 3 1 1053 439.5 0.038 1 1 565.789 1 1492.5 -73 .3 
1 982 3582 5048 8630 265 1 1 1 28 1 1 47 1 1428 379.4 0.032 1 1 856.250 1 1 807.4 -48.9 
1 983 3632 5 1 39 877 1 2744 1 1 5 1 5  23 1 1 1 746 27 1 .4 0.023 1 1 800.000 1 20 1 7.4 2 1 7.4 
1 984 3669 4968 8637 32 16  1 1 853 376 1 2229 235.7 0.0 19  1 2405.263 1 2464.7 59.4 
1 985 3 8 1 5  5 1 75 8990 3324 123 14  494 1 2808 238.5 0.0 1 8  1 3250 .000 1 3046.5 -203.5 
1 986 3955 5378 9333 342 1 1 2754 538 1 3292 264.4 0.020 1 3220.000 1 3556.4 3 36.4 
1 987 4086 5568 9654 3488 1 3 1 42 64 1 1 3783 276.6 0 .020 1 3 830.000 1 4059.6 229.6 
1 988 4229 5755 9984 3527 1 35 1 1  756 1 4267 296.2 0.020 148 10.000 1 4563.2 -246.8 
1989 4273 5835 1 0 1 08 3502 1 36 10  780 1 4390 377.9 0.026 1 4534.6 1 5  1 4767.9 233.3 
1 990 4364 5982 10346 3549 1 3 895 272 1 *  1 66 1 6* 3 83 .2 0.025 1 5328.000 1 6999.2* 1 67 1 .2 *  
1 99 1  4472 6 192 10664 3628 1 4292 2685 16977 352.2 0.023 153 1 3 .043 17329.2 20 16.2 
1992 452 1 6368 1 0889 362 1 1 45 10 273 1 1 724 1 364.0 0.023 15826.087 1 7605 .0 1 778.9 
1993 4498 6422 1 0920 3393 1 43 1 3  3276 1 7589 420.0 0.026 1 6 1 53 . 846 1 8009.0 1 855.2 
1994 437 1  6843 1 1 2 1 4  3285 1 4499 39 14  1 84 1 3  476.0 0.028 1 7000.000 1 8889.0 1 889.0 
1995 4397 6864 1 1 26 1 3 147 1 4408 4685 1 9093 520.0 0.029 1 793 1 .034 1 96 1 3.0 1682.0 
1 996 4277 6967 1 1244 30 1 6  14260 5555 1 98 1 5  553 .0 0.030 1 8433 .333 20368.0 1 934.7 
1997 4040 7004 I 1044 2883 1 3927 6280 20207 570.0 0.03 1 1 8387.097 20777.0 2389.9 
Source: State Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Yearbook 1990, 199 1& 1 998. China Statistical Publishing Hou 
* Sharp change in figures in 1 990 according to the statistical adjustment. 
= ( 1 ) + (2) (5) = (3) + (4) (7) == (5) + (6) ( IO) (8) I (9) 
( 1 1 ) (7) + (8) ( 1 2) = (1 1 ) - ( 10) 
t 
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3.3 Data Analysis of the Change of Ownership Structure of Employment in China's  
Urban Areas 
3.3.1 Divergence between the Data of ULF and RULF 
Theoretically, ULF should equal RULF. Because of measurement errors, a small 
divergence could exist between them. This is evident in the employment data presented in 
Table 3 . 1 ,  during the period from 1 978 to 1 989. In 1 990, the differential between ULF 
and RULF widened to a degree that it can not be attributed solely to the measurement 
error, increasing by about 700% from 1 989 to 1 990. The widening differential represents 
an increase of about 20 million unregistered workers from 1 990 to 1 997 (Figure 3 . 1  ) .  
Two explanations may be used to explain this phenomenon. The first one states that 
since 1 990, the statistics of the total and sub-total employed persons have been adjusted 
by the State Statistical Bureau in accordance with the data obtained from the sample 
surveys on population change (China Statistical Yearbook 1 998, p. 1 27). The second 
explanation suggests that the phenomenon of the huge internal migration of population, 
especially rural-urban migration in China since the late 1 980s, has resulted in the 
increased difference between the actual ULF and the registered ULF (RULF). As 
millions of people flowed into the urban areas, many of them engaged in casual and 
informal jobs. Statistics provided by the enterprises and other units employing them did 
not include the casual and temporary workers in their reports to the government. 
However, the sample surveys on population changes did include them as persons 
employed in urban areas. This may explain the large divergence between the data ofULF 
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and RULF since 1990. The employment data indicates that the actual urban labor force is 
between 10 and 12 percent larger than the registered labor force (Figure 3. 1 ). 
3.3.2 The Change of the Ownership Structure of the Urban Employment 
As a consequence of the reform process, especially since the mid 1980s, the Chinese 
government provided more freedom to enterprises and individuals concerning 
employment determination. The implication is that the proportion of urban labor force 
employed in the public-owned sector will decline. To test this hypothesis, three ratio 
terms are plotted against the time trend in Figure 3 .2. These ratios indicate the percentage 
of persons employed by different sectors to the total urban labor force. 
Ratio- I =LS/ULF 
Ratio-2=LP/ULF 
Ratio-3=LO/ULF 
In Figure 3.2, Ratio- I and Ratio-2 have declined continually, except for a slight 
increase in the early 1980s. This increase in the early 1980s resulted from two political 
events. The first one centers on the reform policies in 1980 in which the Chinese 
government encouraged the establishment of small urban collective enterprises. The 
second event is that by 1981, about 17 million young people who were rusticated to the 
countryside during the "Cultural Revolution" period returned to the cities. In addition to 
new middle school graduates, the government was forced to arrange jobs for these job­
seekers, and most of them were placed as laborers assigned to SO Es and collective 
.e 
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Figure 3. 2 :  Time Series of Employment Ratios ( 1978--1997 ) 
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enterprises: " . . .  in the period from 1978 to 1983, more than 44 million urban job-seekers 
found employment" (Reynolds 1988, p.190). 
Since the mid 1980s, the Chinese government carried out the reform of the "planned 
commodity economy." The non public-owned sectors were encouraged to develop 
swiftly, and greater flexibility was offered to the reform of the former rigid labor 
allocation system. Thus, Ratio- I and Ratio-2 decreased faster than they did during the 
early stage of the reform process. At the same time, the ratio of people working in the 
non public-owned sectors as compared to the total urban labor force continued to grow. 
Because the State Statistical Bureau of China made adjustments (see section 3.3.1.) to the 
statistical method since 1990 (which included the influence of the population migration), 
the statistics of the total urban labor force and employees of the non public-owned sectors 
shifted dramatically in 1990. Hence, the ratios of persons employed by respective sectors 
to the total labor force showed a sudden change in 1990. Ratio- I dropped from 0.6845 to 
0.6086 and Ratio-2 fell from 0.9216 to 0.8174, a drop of about 12%. Ratio-3 increased 
from 0.0528 to 0.1601, an increase of about 303%. During the period from late 1989 to 
1992, accompanying the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square Incident and the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union, the reform process stalled. During this period, the ratios of 
persons employed in the state-owned units and public-owned units stopped decreasing, 
and even increased slightly. On the opposite side, Ratio-3 fell slightly. 
Since late 1992, China abandoned the former planning system and implemented the 
reform policies to establish the socialist market economy. Following this new reform 
process, as well as the restructuring of the public-owned sectors and the dramatic 
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development of the private and other non public-owned sectors, the ownership structure 
of employment in China's urban areas changed significantly. The trend in the ratios 
displayed in Figure 3 .2 accelerated after 1 992. From 1 992 to 1 997, Ratio- I dropped by 
more than 1 2%, Ratio-2 by more than 1 5%, and Ratio-3 increased by more than 66%, 
which was the most significant change. 
It is reasonable to say that the reform process has dramatically changed the 
ownership structure of the employment (allocation of labor) in China's urban areas. Since 
the Chinese government set the goal to complete the establishment of the socialist market 
economy by the end of 20 1 0, more reform policies are sure to be carried out, especially in 
the state-owned sector. China has been putting great effort into restructuring its SO Es. 
Beginning in 1 998, China began to reduce the government staff ( from 1 998 to early 1 999, 
half of the staff of the State Council and all ministries were dismissed) and instituted a 
500,000 man reduction of the People 's  Liberalization Army (Zhu Rongji .  1 999. Report at 
the Second Plenum of the Ninth National People's Congress). All of these factors make it 
clear that a large number of workers have entered or will enter the non public-owned 
sectors. As the non public-owned sectors grow, their ability to absorb new and displaced 
workers will also increase. Thus, it is possible that Ratio-3 could show a more significant 
rise in the first decade of the 2 1 st century; it might even equal Ratio-2 by the year 201 0. 
China proclaimed maintaining socialism as a top priority. Its economy has been 
based on public ownership, therefore, it is very possible that the public-owned sectors 
will remain the main employer of the urban labor force in the long run. 
5 1  
3.4 The Unemployment Problem in China's Urban Areas 
The unemployment problem is very sensitive to every government. It is particularly 
important to the Chinese government, which views full employment as a top priority. As 
stated before, in order to realize the "full employment" goal according to socialist 
principles, China has kept a large proportion of the labor force "unemployed on the job." 
At the end of 1996, in China's urban areas, there were 22 million surplus laborers within 
SOEs and collective enterprises (Xin 1997, p.380). Since the early 1990s, the 
unemployment problem in China's urban areas has become more serious. As China has 
been restructuring its economy toward a market system, many public-owned enterprises, 
especially SO Es, were allowed to be closed down or to "dismiss" (here it refers to 
produce "off-position" persons) employees if they had deficit problems. Thus, a large 
population of unemployed and "off-position" (The "off-position" population is a special 
concept in China, referring to persons who lack work, while the former enterprises still 
offer them minimum salary and welfare benefits) persons surfaced in China's urban areas. 
3.4.1 The Real Extent of the Unemployment Problem in Urban Areas 
The registered unemployed population in China's urban areas has experienced two 
upward structural shifts since the beginning of China's reform process. The first occurred 
during the period from 1978 to the early 1980s, when a large number of young people 
who were rusticated to the rural areas returned to the cities. The second wave began in 
1993 and still continues today. 
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The phenomenon of the large "off-position" population began in 1993. According to 
the research from the State Research Academy of China, from 1993 to 1997, the figures 
of the "off-position" population are: 3 million in 1993, 3.6 million in 1994, 5.64 million 
in 1995, 8.916 million in 1996 and 12 million in 1997 (Hu 1998, p.4). The "off-position" 
population is a very blurred concept because it involves two categories of the population: 
( 1) people who have no work, and (2) people who are reassigned to new jobs (Xin 1997). 
Thus, people in the first category should be included in the unemployed population by 
international standards. The actual unemployed population and unemployment rate in 
China's urban areas should be much higher than those shown in the registered data. For 
example, suppose that 40% of the "off-position" population (a low estimation) has not 
been reassigned to new jobs, more realistic estimations of unemployed workers and 
unemployment rates are provided in the table below (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Real Unemployment Population Estimators In China's  Urban Areas (in millions) 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year UNNEM Off-position Unemployed Persons in Real Unemployed Pop. Real Unemployment Rate(%) 
Population Off-position Pop.( 40% estimation) (Estimated) 
1 993 4.2 3.0 1 .2 5.4 3.3 
1 994 4.76 3.6 1 .44 6.2 3.6 
1 995 5.2 5 .64 2.256 7.456 4.0 
1 996 5 .53 8.91 6  3 .56 9.09 4.9 
1 997 5 .7 12  4 .8  1 0.5  5 .7 
Sources: Data in column 1 are cited from China Statistical Yearbook 1998. Data in column 2 are from 
Hu[ 1998] . Others are calculated by using the 40% estimation. 
(4) = (1) + (3) 
(5) = (4) I ULF 
From Table 3.2, it can be seen that the unemployment problem in China's urban 
areas has been understated in government estimates and the actual unemployment level 
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has increased. If the large population of surplus laborers who are still in the public-owned 
sectors and newly generated young job-seekers are included, "till the end of 2000, the 
unemployed population in the urban areas will reach 16 million, the unemployment rate 
will increase to be 7.4%" (Xin 1997, p.380). Since high unemployment rates bear the 
risks of sociopolitical instability and loss of GDP, it becomes an urgent task for the 
Chinese government to carry out effective reform policies to create sufficient jobs for 
people. 
3.4.2 Some Explanations to the Unemployment Problem 
The following reasons may be used to explain why, since 1993, a serious problem of 
unemployment in China's urban areas has developed. 
< A >. Rapid Growth of the Labor Supply 
The growth rate of China's population within the working age is much higher than 
that of the total population. According to the policy goal, to reach "full employment," the 
percentage of people employed of the total population in China is much higher than that 
of other countries in the world. In 1993, this percentage in China was 57%, while in the 
industrialized countries it averaged 49%. Also, since the establishment of P. R. China in 
1949, Chinese women are given equal opportunities in employment, education and their 
social lives. Hence, the ratio of women employed in relation to the total labor force is 
very high in China. In 1993, this ratio averaged 44% for all developed countries and 39% 
for all developing countries, but in China it was 45% (UNDP 1996, p.168-169). All of 
these factors place great pressure on the Chinese government to provide jobs for an 
increasing population. According to the World Bank.[1997], in 1995 the labor force in 
China consisted of 26.3% of that in the world, but in the same year China's domestic 
investment only occupies 3.4% of the total investment in the world. Thus, China used a 
small capital resource to expand employment opportunities for about 25% of the total 
labor force in the world. This situation is very difficult to improve in a brief period of 
time as China engages in the reform process, which requires a large amount of capital 
resources. 
< B >. Significant Structural Changes 
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Rapid economic development since 1978 has resulted in significant changes to 
China's economy. Two important changes might be attributed to the occurrence of the 
large unemployed population. The first one is the rapid change of the industrial structure. 
Since 1978, China's agricultural sector changed from an absorbing sector of labor force 
to an excluding sector. The contribution of the agricultural sector to the total labor force 
employed declined from 70% in 1 978 to 50% in 1 995. This economic transformation 
took Japan 60 years to complete ( 1870-1829), and took the U.S. 50 years ( 1820-1870) 
(Hu 1 998, p. 7). In comparison, China's structural change is occurring in a very short time 
period relative to the historical norm. Although the decline of agriculture's share was an 
unavoidable result of industrialization, it freed the rural-urban migration and intensified 
the urban unemployment problem. 
In conclusion, China is now undergoing a dramatic structural change and moving 
toward a market economy. During this transformation, labor resources will be 
reallocated. In the initial period, the ratio of persons employed by the public-owned 
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sectors compared to the total labor force has declined rapidly in China. However, the non 
public-owned sectors have only begun to emerge, and do not have the ability to absorb all 
of labor surplus leaving the public-owned sectors. Thus, China may not be able to avoid a 
large structural unemployed population (including "off-position" people). As the growth 
in non public-owned sectors accelerates, their ability to provide jobs for the unemployed 
population should also increase, which in tum will contribute to improving or even 
solving the unemployment problem. 
3.4.3 A Few Policy Suggestions 
Based on the discussion above on the unemployment problem, the following policy 
suggestions might offer possible solutions for the problem of large unemployment and 
"off-position" population in China's urban areas. 
<1>. The state and local governments should set goals to reduce the real unemployment 
rate as one of the most important policy tasks, and make reducing the unemployment 
population one of the criteria to evaluate and promote government officials. 
<2>. Intensively develop labor-intensive industries, including the services industry. The 
Chinese government should also continue to enlarge its exports of labor-intensive 
commodities and labor services. 
<3>. Intensively develop non public-owned sectors in the urban areas, and encourage 
people to work in non public-owned and informal sectors. In rural areas, the government 
should offer preferential conditions for TVEs to accelerate their developing paces. 
<4>. Accelerate the establishment of a social unemployment insurance system, and 
develop training and retraining systems for the labor population. 
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Chapter IV. Conclusions & Recommendations for Future Research 
4.1 Conclusions 
Since the 1970s, many socialist countries have carried out reform policies to 
restructure their economies. Among them, China realized significant economic and 
sociopolitical development. China 's reform experience differs from those of other 
countries. Based on its special conditions, China followed a gradual reform process to 
spur economic development. With more than twenty years of reform experience, this 
gradual reform strategy has proved correct for China' s  economic revitalization. 
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China began its reform process from the ground-up by granting managerial 
autonomy to enterprises and rural households. The market mechanism was, at first, only 
introduced under the control of the planned system. When the enterprises and peasant 
households realized increased production effectively, the market adjustment mechanism 
gained greater importance in China's economy as a resource allocation mechanism. From 
the "birdcage economy" era to the "planned commodity economy" period and later to the 
establishment of the "socialist market economy," the Chinese government gradually set 
the market-oriented direction for its reform process and carried out reform policies to 
China's sociopolitical and economic fields. Also, step by step, China 's economy has been 
opened up to the outside world. 
In the areas of employment and migration control, the Chinese government has 
gradually freed the former rigid labor allocation and "hukou" systems. As a consequence, 
the employment in China's urban areas has been undergoing structural changes .  
Following the dramatic development of private and foreign-invested enterprises, more 
and more workers (including rural-urban immigrants) found their jobs in non public­
owned sectors. Thus, the ownership structure of the employment in China's urban areas 
has changed dramatically. However, the economic transformation process has also 
created an unemployment problem for the Chinese government since 1 993 . 
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The Chinese government is now putting a great deal of effort into economic 
modernization and sociopolitical development. Following the establishment of the 
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics and the accelerating development 
of the non public-owned sectors, further changes in the employment structure of China's 
urban areas will occur. The expanding non public-owned sectors should also improve the 
unemployment problem. 
4.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
Employment in China is an interesting topic for the research in the areas of 
economics and social science. Due to time restraints, this paper can only present primary 
research on the structural change of employment in China' s  urban areas. To further this 
research, the following points might suggest some directions. 
First, a few models can be established regarding the ownership structural change of 
the employment in China's urban areas. With these models, the future changing tendency 
of the ownership structure of employment could be forecast. This might be useful for the 
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policy makers to more thoroughly understand the employment problems in China's urban 
areas and set efficient reform policies. 
Second, a regional or provincial comparison can be done if data concerning the 
structural change of the employment of different regions or provinces are included in the 
research. This comparative research might be useful for understanding the inequality 
problems between China's different regions and provinces. 
Third, other changes of the employment structure, like the industrial structure of the 
employment, can be taken into account. From which the relationship between the 
structural change in production and the structural change in labor allocation within the 
reform process could be linked directly. 
Fourth, the structural changes of employment in China's rural areas can be included 
in the research, which will make the research more comprehensive and reveal the entire 
tendency of the structural change of employment during China's reform period. 
Finally, this research can be used to determine the current unemployment problem in 
China's urban areas, which in tum is also a specific research topic. 
China's reform experience and economic development strategies provide new 
resources for the research in the fields of macroeconomics, political economy and 
economic development. As the Chinese government furthers the reform process toward 
the establishment of a socialist market economy, China's experience will provide insight 
on the economic and sociopolitical development of the developing countries in the world. 
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